

# PALISADE

## HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION FOR PALISADE USERS: TUTORIAL WITH APPLICATIONS

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
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# HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION FOR PALISADE USERS

- Tutorial with applications consisting of 3 episodes (6 lectures)
- **Episode 1**
  - Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption
  - Boolean Arithmetic with Applications
- Episode 2
  - Integer Arithmetic
  - Applications of Homomorphic Encryption over Integers
- Episode 3
  - Approximate Number Arithmetic
  - Applications of Homomorphic Encryption over Approximate Numbers



# PALISADE

## HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION FOR PALISADE USERS: TUTORIAL WITH APPLICATIONS

### Introduction to Homomorphic Encryption

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# AGENDA

- Basics
  - What is homomorphic encryption?
  - Typical computations and examples of applications supported by HE
  - Main concepts
- Main approaches
  - Classes of homomorphic computations
    - Boolean circuit approach
    - Modular (exact) arithmetic approach
    - Approximate number approach
  - Setting security parameters




# Basics

Introduces HE, typical computations, example applications, and main concepts

# WHAT IS HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION?

- Encryption protocol with one extra operation: Evaluation
  - Allows for computation on encrypted data
  - Enables outsourcing of data storage/processing
- How is HE related to symmetric and public key encryption?
  - HE schemes provide efficient instantiations of post-quantum public-key and symmetric-key encryption schemes
  - Homomorphic encryption can be viewed as a generalization of public key encryption
- Key milestones in the history of homomorphic encryption
  - Rivest, Adleman, Dertouzos (1978) -- “On Data Banks and Privacy Homomorphisms”
  - Gentry (2009) -- “A Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme”
  - Multiple HE schemes developed after 2009

# EXAMPLE OF HE WORKFLOW



# HE vs OTHER SECURE COMPUTING APPROACHES

|                        | HE            | MPC                        | SGX                  |
|------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Performance            | Compute-bound | Network-bound              |                      |
| Privacy                | Encryption    | Encryption / Non-collusion | Trusted Hardware     |
| Non-interactive        | ✓             | ✗                          | ✓                    |
| Cryptographic security | ✓             | ✓                          | ✗<br>(known attacks) |

Hybrid approaches are also possible, e.g., MPC + HE



# TYPICAL HE OPERATIONS

- Encrypt bits and perform logical AND, OR, XOR operations on the ciphertexts.
  - $0 \text{ AND } 1 \rightarrow 0$ ,  $0 \text{ OR } 1 \rightarrow 1$ ,  $1 \text{ XOR } 1 \rightarrow 0$
- Encrypt small integers and perform addition and multiplication, as long as the result does not exceed some fixed bound, for instance, if the bound is 10000
  - $123 + 456 \rightarrow 579$ ,  $12 * 432 \rightarrow 5184$ ,  $35 * 537 \rightarrow \text{overflow}$
- Encrypt 8-bit unsigned integers (between 0 and 255) and perform addition and multiplication modulo 256
  - $128 + 128 \rightarrow 0$ ,  $2 * 129 \rightarrow 2$
- Encrypt fixed-point numbers and perform addition and multiplication with the result rounded to a fixed precision, for instance, two digits after the decimal point
  - $12.42 + 1.34 \rightarrow 13.76$ ,  $2.23 + 5.19 \rightarrow 11.57$
- Different homomorphic encryption schemes support different plaintext types and different operations on them.


# SOME EXAMPLES OF REAL-SCALE HE APPLICATIONS

- Private information retrieval
  - <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1142>, IEEE S&P 2018
- Private set intersection
  - <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/299>, ACM CCS 2017
- Genome-wide association studies based on chi-square test and logistic regression training
  - <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/563>, PNAS 2020
- Logistic regression training
  - <https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/662>, AAAI Conference on AI 2019

# MAIN CONCEPTS


- *Homomorphic*: a (secret) mapping from plaintext space to ciphertext space that preserves arithmetic operations.
- *Mathematical Hardness: (Ring) Learning with Errors Assumption*
  - Every image (ciphertext) of this mapping looks uniformly random in range (ciphertext space).
- *Security level*: the hardness of inverting this mapping without the secret key
  - Often estimated as a work factor.
    - Example: 128 bits  $\rightarrow 2^{128}$  operations to break using best known lattice attack
- *Plaintext*: Elements and operations of a polynomial ring  $(\text{mod } x^n + 1, \text{mod } p)$ .
  - Example:  $3x^5 + x^4 + 2x^3 + \dots$
  - For all practical purposes, you can think of it as a vector of (small) finite integers
- *Ciphertext*: elements and operations of a polynomial ring  $(\text{mod } x^n + 1, \text{mod } q)$ .
  - Example:  $7862x^5 + 5652x^4 + \dots$
  - For all practical purposes, you can think of it as a vector of (larger) finite integers
- *Noise*: random integers with Gaussian distribution, which are “added” to the plaintext to achieve the desired security level based on Ring Learning With Errors

# FRESH ENCRYPTION




- Horizontal: each coefficient in a polynomial or in a vector.
- Vertical: size of coefficients.
- Initial noise is small in terms of coefficients' size.

# AFTER SOME COMPUTATIONS



- Horizontal: each coefficient in a polynomial or in a vector.
- Vertical: size of coefficients.
- Initial noise is small in terms of coefficients' size.


# NOISE OVERFLOW (RESULTS IN DECRYPTION FAILURE)



- Horizontal: each coefficient in a polynomial or in a vector.
- Vertical: size of coefficients.
- Initial noise is small in terms of coefficients' size.

# BOOTSTRAPPING (NOISE REFRESHING PROCEDURE)

Evaluates the decryption circuit homomorphically and resets the noise.



- Horizontal: each coefficient in a polynomial or in a vector.
- Vertical: size of coefficients.
- Initial noise is small in terms of coefficients' size.

# TYPES OF HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

- Partially homomorphic encryption (weakest notion)
  - supports only one type of operation, e.g. addition or multiplication.
- Somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes
  - can evaluate two types of gates/operations, but only for a subset of circuits.
- **Leveled fully homomorphic encryption**
  - supports more than one operation but only computations of a predetermined size (typically multiplicative depth); supports much deeper circuits than somewhat homomorphic encryption
- **Fully homomorphic encryption**
  - supports arbitrary computation on encrypted data, and is the strongest notion of homomorphic encryption.





# Main approaches

Introduces classes of homomorphic computations  
and security parameters

# CLASSES OF HOMOMORPHIC COMPUTATIONS

It is important to choose the right approach for your HE computation:

## 1. Boolean Circuits

- Plaintext data represented as **bits**
- Computations expressed as **Boolean circuits**

## 2. Modular (Exact) Arithmetic

- Plaintext data represented as **integers modulo a plaintext modulus “ $p$ ”** (or their vectors)
- Computations expressed as **integer arithmetic mod  $p$**

## 3. Approximate Number Arithmetic

- Plaintext data represented as **real numbers** (or complex numbers)
- Compute model similar to **floating-point arithmetic** but dealing with fixed-point numbers

# BOOLEAN CIRCUITS APPROACH

- Features:
  - Fast number comparison
  - Supports arbitrary Boolean circuits
  - Fast bootstrapping (noise refreshing procedure)
- Selected schemes:
  - Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) [GSW13] - foundation for other schemes
  - Fastest Homomorphic Encryption in the West (FHEW) [DM15]
  - Fast Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus (TFHE) [CGGI16,CGGI17]

# MODULAR (EXACT) ARITHMETIC APPROACH

- Features:
  - Efficient SIMD computations over vectors of integers (using batching)
  - Fast high-precision integer arithmetic
  - Fast private information retrieval/private set intersection
  - Leveled design (often used without bootstrapping)
- Selected schemes:
  - Brakerski-Vaikuntanathan (BV) [BV11] - foundation for other schemes
  - Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) [BGV12, GHS12]
  - Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) [Brakerski12, FV12, BEHZ16, HPS18]

# APPROXIMATE NUMBER ARITHMETIC APPROACH

- Features:
  - Efficient SIMD computations over vectors of real numbers (using batching)
  - Fast polynomial approximation
  - Relatively fast multiplicative inverse and Discrete Fourier Transform
  - Deep approximate computations, such as logistic regression learning
  - Leveled design (often used without bootstrapping)
- Selected schemes:
  - Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) [CKKS17]

# SCHEMES SUPPORTED BY PALISADE

| Library/<br>Scheme or Extension | BGV | BFV | CKKS | FHEW | TFHE | Threshold<br>FHE (MP) | Proxy Re-<br>Encryption<br>(MP) |
|---------------------------------|-----|-----|------|------|------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| FHEW                            |     |     |      | ✓    |      |                       |                                 |
| HEAAN/HEAAN-RNS                 |     |     | ✓    |      |      |                       |                                 |
| HELib                           | ✓   |     | ✓    |      |      |                       |                                 |
| Lattigo                         |     | ✓   | ✓    |      |      | ✓                     |                                 |
| PALISADE                        | ✓   | ✓   | ✓    | ✓    | ✓    | ✓                     | ✓                               |
| SEAL                            |     | ✓   | ✓    |      |      |                       |                                 |
| TFHE                            |     |     |      |      | ✓    |                       |                                 |

# SELECTING SECURITY PARAMETERS

The ciphertext dimension (degree of polynomial) should be chosen according to the security tables published at [HomomorphicEncryption.org](https://homomorphicencryption.org) (PALISADE selects it automatically).

| distribution | n    | security level | logq | uSVP  | dec   | dual  |
|--------------|------|----------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| (-1, 1)      | 1024 | 128            | 27   | 131.6 | 160.2 | 138.7 |
|              |      | 192            | 19   | 193.0 | 259.5 | 207.7 |
|              |      | 256            | 14   | 265.6 | 406.4 | 293.8 |
|              | 2048 | 128            | 54   | 129.7 | 144.4 | 134.2 |
|              |      | 192            | 37   | 197.5 | 233.0 | 207.8 |
|              |      | 256            | 29   | 259.1 | 321.7 | 273.5 |
|              | 4096 | 128            | 109  | 128.1 | 134.9 | 129.9 |
|              |      | 192            | 75   | 194.7 | 212.2 | 198.5 |
|              |      | 256            | 58   | 260.4 | 292.6 | 270.1 |
|              | 8192 | 128            | 218  | 128.5 | 131.5 | 129.2 |
|              |      | 192            | 152  | 192.2 | 200.4 | 194.6 |
|              |      | 256            | 118  | 256.7 | 273.0 | 260.6 |



# THANK YOU

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